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EVIDENCE: DEVELOPMENTS IN CHARACTER EVIDENCE,
CROSS-EXAMINATION RULES, AND PRIOR
CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
JEFFREY COLE*
Practically the whole body of the law of evidence governing ... tri-
als in the federal courts has been judge-made .... Naturally these
evidentiary rules have not remained unchanged. They have adapted
themselves to progressive notions of relevance in the pursuit of truth
through adversary litigation, and have reflected dominant concep-
tions of standards appropriate for the effective and civilized adminis-
tration of law.'
With characteristic eloquence, Mr. Justice Frankfurter once ob-
served that the "rules of evidence for. . . trials in the federal courts are
made a part of living law and [are] not treated as a mere collection of
wooden rules in a game." 2 Rather, they "are adopted for practical pur-
poses in the administration of justice, and must be so applied, as to
promote the ends for which they are designed." 3
The force of these penetrating observations has not been dulled
either by time's attrition or by Congress' adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence in 1975. 4 Indeed, the rules themselves belie any notion
that they were meant to sound the death knell for judicial involvement
in the creative development of evidentiary concepts or that they were a
kind of catechism, the mere invocation of which would automatically
solve evidentiary problems.5
* Mr. Cole is in the private practice of law in Chicago, Illinois and is an Adjunct Professor
of Law at I I T/Chicago-Kent College of Law, where he teaches a course in trial advocacy. He
previously has served as the Chief of the Appellate Division and Assistant Chief of the Criminal
Division in the Office of the United States Attorney. Mr. Cole has authored numerous other law
review articles and was counsel for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, as amicus
curaie, in the United States Supreme Court case of First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978).
1. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 66 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.) (citations omitted).
2. Id. See also Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277-78 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) ("The rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic and common sense, less
hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law.").
3. United States v. Reyburn, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 352, 367 (1832).
4. Although the United States Supreme Court promulgated the rules on November 20,
1972, to take effect on July 1, 1973, and although the proposed rules were transmitted to Congress
on February 5, 1973, the rules did not become law until January 2, 1975, when President Ford
signed Public Law 93-595 (effective date July 1, 1975). The rules govern all proceedings in the
courts of the United States and before United States magistrates to the extent and with the excep-
tions stated in rule 1101. See FED. R. EvID. 101.
5. This does not mean, however, that the federal courts are wholly free to improvise. Work-
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Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that the rules
"shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and develop-
ment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascer-
tained and proceedings justly determined." Rule 102 thus condemns
Procrustean application of the Federal Rules of Evidence and makes
clear that the rules contain sufficient breadth of view and flexibility of
adaptation to achieve the desiderata of ascertainment of truth and the
just and prompt determination of cases. 6
The 1978-79 term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit contained a number of interesting and significant cases
which continued the process of interstitial development of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. It would not be feasible, of course, to analyze here
every case presenting evidentiary disputes. Instead, those cases have
been selected which are likely to have an impact on future decisions or
which present issues that recur with substantial frequency in cases tried
in the federal courts. That most of the cases discussed are criminal
rather than civil stems not from personal preference but merely from
the fact that such cases predominated during the 1978-79 term.7 How-
ever, since the rules generally apply equally to both civil and criminal
cases, the decisions have applicability to both kinds of cases.
ing within the framework of the rules, judges will still be "confined from molar to molecular
motions," Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For
an example of a case where the Seventh Circuit felt itself confined by the language of the rules, see
United States v. Werbrouck, 589 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979).
6. Four striking examples of the rules' capacity for and susceptibility to a kind of common
law development are found in rules 403, 501, 803(24), and 804(b)(5). Rule 403 allows district
courts to exclude relevant evidence where the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 501 leaves the question of privileges to be
developed in "light of reason and experience." Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) invest in the federal
courts the authority to fashion exceptions to the hearsay rule not provided for in the rules. See
United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1350 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 78-1751 (Oct. 1, 1979).
7. The overwhelming bulk of the civil cases decided by the Seventh Circuit simply did not
present evidentiary issues. Even the appeals in Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy Inc., 585
F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979) and Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d
600 (7th Cir. 1979), did not call upon the court to resolve evidentiary issues despite the fact that
the trials in the cases lasted four and eighteen months, respectively. And the famous In re Gen-
eral Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979), contained only a
single reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence in a brief footnote in which the court held that
inquiry into the conduct of negotiations resulting in a settlement of the case was not barred by rule
408 since the inquiry was not designed to obtain information to be used in proving liability or
damages. Id. at 1124 n.20. The few civil cases presenting evidentiary questions were not espe-
cially exciting. For example, in Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1978), the
issue was whether the use of enlarged photographs of various defects in a home was proper. Not
surprisingly, the court held that their use was not only proper but desirable. Id. at 1089.
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CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND RULES 403 AND 404
Character is never an issue in a criminal prosecution unless the
defendant chooses to make it one. From the perspective of due process,
a defendant starts his life afresh when he stands accused of a crime.
Inflexibly, the law has set its face against an endeavor to fasten guilt
upon a defendant by proof of character or experience predisposing to
an act of crime.8
The principle of exclusion is not one of logic, but of policy. The
law has not been blind to the argument that a man with a sordid past is
more likely to commit future crimes than is one with a more laudable
history; however, the law is equally sensitive to the peril to the innocent
if character is accepted as evidence probative of guilt.
It has long been recognized that "the natural and inevitable ten-
dency of the tribunal - whether judge or jury - is to give excessive
weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow
it to bear too strongly on the present charge or to take the proof of it as
justifying condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge." 9
In order to insure that the trier of fact is not overawed by evidence the
sole relevance of which is to demonstrate that the defendant is an evil
man and is thus predisposed to commit the offense charged, proof of
such evidence is inadmissible. This policy of exclusion is not, however,
irrecusable. Where the evidence has independent relevance, such as
tending to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity' or absence of mistake or accident, it may be received so
long as its probative significance is not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. I
New rules 40412 and 40313 of the Federal Rules of Evidence incor-
8. See generally I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 57, 192 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) [hereinafter
referred to as WIGMORE].
9. People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 198, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930) (Cardozo, C.J.), quoting
WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 194.
10. In Barksdale v. Sielaff, 585 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2409 (1979),
the state introduced in rebuttal evidence which conveyed to the jury the fact that the defendant
was in jail at some earlier time in connection with a wholly unrelated offense. The Seventh Cir-
cuit sustained the introduction of this evidence since it tended to prove the identity of the defend-
ant. See also United States v. Sutherland, 463 F.2d 641, 649 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078
(1972); United States v. Pentado, 463 F.2d355 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909 (1973).
11. See United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 942 (1976).
12. FED. R. EVID. 404 provides, in pertinent part:
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porate these principles 4 and make them applicable to both civil and
criminal cases tried in the federal courts. '5 On several occasions during
the 1978-79 term, the Seventh Circuit spoke to the admissibility of
character evidence under rule 404 and the relationship of that rule to
rule 403.
In United States v. Dixon,' 6 the Seventh Circuit approved the ad-
mission of evidence in the government's case-in-chief that the defend-
ant had carried a knife at various times. The court held that since
intent was an element of the offense, 17 proof of the prior similar behav-
ior had independent relevance, and its admissibility was thus proper
under rule 404.18 However, the court did not decide whether under the
federal rules, as under pre-rules practice, the proof of the prior conduct
had to pass the "clear and convincing" test, nor did it discuss the scope
of the duty of the district court under rule 403 when a party seeks to
admit evidence having independent relevance under rule 404.19 These
questions were subsequently answered in United States v. Dolliole.20
In Dolliole, the defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting his
brother-in-law in the robbery of a federally-insured savings and loan
institution. The sole issue on appeal was the admissibility at trial of
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity there-
with on a particular occasion ....
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conform-
ity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of mo-
tive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
13. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
14. United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976).
15. Use of character evidence under rule 404 is to be distinguished from impeachment with
evidence of convictions and misconduct under rules 608 and 609.
16. 596 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1979).
17. The defendant was charged with possessing a knife in a federal institution in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1792 (1976).
18. 596 F.2d at 182.
19. The court merely cited one of its own pre-rules decisions for the proposition that the
evidence had to be clear and convincing and that district courts were required to weigh the proba-
tive value of the evidence against the danger of prejudice. See United States v. Ostrowsky, 501
F.2d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hampton, 457 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 856 (1972); United States v. Jones, 438 F.2d 461, 465-66 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Fierson, 419 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Phillips, 401 F.2d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1968).
In United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1978), decided four months prior to Dixon, the
court expressly noted that it was unclear whether the clear and convincing test was lowered by the
federal rules. Id. at 386 n.5.
20. 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2894 (1979).
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testimony by the brother-in-law and another individual that the de-
fendant had previously planned the robbery of a second bank and had
actually participated in the robbery of a third bank.21
In affirming the conviction, the Seventh Circuit unhesitatingly
held that the evidence was clearly relevant to the issue of the defend-
ant's intent and that it was thus admissible under rule 404. The more
difficult question was whether, notwithstanding its independent rele-
vance, the evidence was received in contravention of rule 403.
In what was perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of rules
403 and 404 during the 1978-79 term,22 the Seventh Circuit in Dolliole
held the evidence was properly admitted. The significance of Dolliole
lies not in its result but in the court's careful exposition of the doctrinal
basis which undergirded the decision.23 In stressing that "[r]ules 403
and 404 do not represent a mechanical solution" 24 to- evidentiary
problems, the court demonstrated its sensitivity to the concept that "the
process of judging is a phase of a never ending movement, and . . .
something more is exacted of those who play their part in it than imita-
tive reproduction, the lifeless repetition of a mechanical routine. 25
The Seventh Circuit held, however, that evidence which qualifies
for admissibility under rule 404 because it has independent relevance is
not automatically admissible. Rather, rule 403 requires a district judge
to balance the probative value of the evidence against the danger of
unfair prejudice.26 In an attempt to reify the amorphous standards of
21. This testimony was admitted in rebuttal after the defendant testified that he had no
knowledge of the robbery committed by his brother-in-law. 597 F.2d at 104.
22. See also United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 78-1751
(Oct. 1, 1979).
23. The necessity for craftsmanship and reasoned exposition in judicial decisions was ad-
verted to by Mr. Justice Stone in a letter to Felix Frankfurter: "I can hardly see the use of writing
judicial opinions unless they are to embody methods of analysis and exposition which will serve
the profession as a guide to the decision of future cases. If they are not better than an excursion
ticket, good for this day and trip only, they do not serve even as protective coloration of the writer
of the opinions and would much better be left unsaid." Letter from Mr. Justice Stone to Felix
Frankfurter quoted in A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 105-06 (1958).
24. 597 F.2d at 105.
25. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 142-43 (1948). See Pound, Mechanical Juris-
prudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). See also H. SHANKS, THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING:
THE DECISIONS OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND (1968). At the proceedings of a special session in the
Second Circuit in commemoration of his fifty years of federal judicial service, Judge Hand said:
I like to think that the work of a judge is an art. . . . After all, why isn't it in the nature
of an art? It is a bit of craftsmanship, isn't it? It is what a poet does, it is what a sculptor
does. He has some vague purposes and he has an indefinite number of what you might
call frames of preference among which he must choose; for choose he has to, and he
does.
26. 597 F.2d at 106. While the court "encouraged" district judges to enter written findings in
this regard, it followed the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.
1978), in refusing to impose a mechanical recitation of rule 403's formula as a prerequisite to
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rule 403, the Seventh Circuit held that among the objective factors to
be considered are the need for the evidence and its "reliability" deter-
mined by whether it is "clear and convincing". 27 In the court's view,
the latter requirement did not expand the grounds for exclusion, set
forth in rule 403, which defines the sole basis upon which relevant evi-
dence can be excluded.28
After articulating certain of the criteria to be employed in making
decisions under rule 403, the court exhaustively explored the reasons
why, in its view, the district court had not abused its discretion in ad-
mitting the evidence of the other crimes. 29 The most significant aspect
of that analysis is the court's rejection of the argument that the evi-
dence of the defendant's prior involvement in two other bank robberies
was of such a "nature . ..[as to have] subjected the defendant to a
substantial risk" of unfair prejudice. 30
With the decision in Dolliole, the Seventh Circuit has rejected a
construction of rule 403 which would have made substantial changes in
the entrenched common law principle which allows evidence of prior
similar acts or wrongs so long as they have independent relevance. The
court also has made it clear that rule 403 does not invest in district
courts a vagrant and unfettered freedom to exclude relevant evidence. 31
Rather, the discretion accorded by rule 403 must be regulated by prin-
admissibility. All that need be present is that the record as a whole makes clear that there was an
adequate appraisal of the situation. It is not clear whether the court was encouraging district
judges merely to make a specific finding which would mirror the language of rule 403 or whether
it was encouraging a detailed exegesis of the reasons which underlay the decision to admit or
exclude the challenged evidence. Requiring the former alternative would not be edifying, and
requiring the latter would unduly prolong trials with no appreciable benefit to the due administra-
tion ofjustice. The situation is not comparable to that envisioned by rule 52 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which requires district courts to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in
cases where trial is to the court and in injunction cases. In these situations, findings of fact are
imperative, for without them there can be no meaningful review pursuant to the "clearly errone-
ous" standard. Similarly, conclusions of law help to give a reviewing court a framework for its
review. In cases involving rule 403, no comparable purpose is served, for the "finding" by the
district court is not a finding of fact, nor is it strictly speaking a conclusion of law. It is rather a
kind of mixed finding, the validity of which cannot retrospectively be ascertained without a com-
plete review of the entire trial record by the reviewing court. Hence, to require district courts to
enter findings which detail the reasons which prompted evidentiary determinations under rule 403
would serve no substantial purpose. The only merit would be in forcing district courts to actually
engage in the balancing process required by rule 403.
27. 597 F.2d at 106. Accord, United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1344 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, No. 78-1751 (Oct. 1, 1979). But see United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.
1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
28. 597 F.2d at 106-07.
29. Id. at 107-08.
30. Id. at 108. The court cited the advisory note's definition of "unfair prejudice" as "an
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis." Id.
31. The Seventh Circuit's attempt to establish and formulate objective criteria for exercises of
discretion under rule 403 recognizes that "[wle must not incite the exercise ofjudicial impression-
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ciple, the contours of which will be defined at least partially by prior
case law. 32
Finally, in United States v. McPartlin,33 the Seventh Circuit has
laid to rest any notion that rule 403 will result in fundamentally new or
stricter standards of appellate review. On the contrary, the court in
McPartlin emphasized the "heavy burden" an appellant must sustain
when exercising a challenge to evidence under rule 403 and reaffirmed
the pre-rules doctrine:
[T]he careful balancing of the probative value of prior acts versus
their probable unduly prejudicial effect is uniquely appropriate to
the informed discretion of the trial judge ....
The highly judgmental character of this test mandates that [a
reviewing court] not restrike the balance [itself] but instead only ex-
amine the manner in which the district court exercised its discre-
tion.34
CROSs-ExAMINATION
1978-79 Seventh Circuit Decisions in General
Today, a case is rarely the subject of appellate review where the
court is not importuned to reverse an unfavorable judgment because of
either the supposed presence or absence of restrictions placed on cross-
examination. In such a case, the appellant either claims that the scope
of his cross-examination of adverse witnesses was unduly circum-
scribed by the district court or that the appellee's cross-examination of
the appellant's witnesses was not sufficiently restricted. The Seventh
Circuit heard several such claims during the 1978-79 term.
Despite the vigor with which these claims of error were urged, the
Seventh Circuit rejected all of them. 35 Implicit in these decisions is a
ism. Discretion without a criterion for its exercise is authorization of arbitrariness." Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 496 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., alternative holding).
32. Buisee United States v. Hooper, 596 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1979) (repayment of money owed
to University of Wisconsin admissible as an admission against interest, and its admission not
barred by rule 403); United States v. McPanlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1342-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, No.
78-1751 (Oct. 1, 1979) (rebuttal evidence that defendant made bribery payments to foreign offi-
cials in other unrelated matters properly admitted under rule 404(b) and not violative of rule 403).
33. 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 78-1751 (Oct. 1, 1979).
34. 595 F.2d at 1345. While the court in Doliole looked basically to the essential nature and
content of the evidence to determine whether there was unfair prejudice, MePartin focused on the
procedures undertaken by the district court to minimize possible prejudice (ie., voir dire of rebut-
tal witness to determine testimony; careful selection of only pans of testimony allowed into evi-
dence; careful limiting instructions). Although Dolliole established objective criteria to guide
exercises of discretion under rule 403, while McParlin spoke of the "highly judgmental character"
of a district court's function under the rule, it is doubtful that there is anything more than a
difference in accent and emphasis between the two cases. It is likely that these cases merely repre-
sent obverse sides of the same basic inquiry.
35. In addition to the cases discussed infra, see United States v. Werbrouck, 589 F.2d 273
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reaffirmation of the concept that "cross-examination of a witness in
matters pertaining to his credibility ought to be given the largest possi-
ble scope." 36
Perhaps the most interesting of the cases is United States v. Frank-
enthal,37 in which the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to intercept
wire communications was affirmed. 38 The cynosure of the appeal was
that the government's cross-examination of Myron Berk, a defense wit-
ness, irreparably prejudiced the defendant, thereby requiring a reversal
of the conviction. In summary, the facts are as follows.3 9
Berk was a lawyer who had long been counsel to the defendant's
deceased father and served as the president of the lucrative Franken-
thal family businesses after the father's death.40 Berk was called as a
defense witness to testify that he had advised the Frankenthals that
their plan to monitor the telephone conversations of their employees
was not illegal.4' If believed, this evidence might have provided a de-
fense to one of the counts in the five-count indictment.42
On the direct examination of Berk, defense counsel elicited the
fact that Berk had been a close and long-time friend of the Frankenthal
family.43 No testimony was elicited on direct examination about any
meeting between Berk and district court Judge Gordon. On cross-ex-
amination, the government attempted to elicit the details of a meeting
which Berk had initiated with Judge Gordon less than one month
before the Frankenthal trial was scheduled to begin in Judge Gordon's
court.
4 4
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979); United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 369 (7th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Muscarella, 585 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978).
36. McConnell v. United States, 393 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 1968). Accord, Harris v. United
States, 371 F.2d 365, 366 (9th Cir. 1967). Cf Altom v. United States, 454 F.2d 289, 296 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972) (generally, a broad rule of admissibility is favored in the
federal courts).
37. 582 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1978).
38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2511(l)(a), 2511(i)(b)(iv)(A) (1976).
39. The incredible facts of this case demonstrate how officious behavior by a person with
little understanding of the rules of evidence can profoundly affect the outcome of a trial.
40. 582 F.2d at 1104-05.
41. Id. The monitoring was done in an attempt to detect whether any employees were trans-
mitting information which could be damaging to the Frankenthals' business.
42. Id. at 1105.
43. Eliciting on direct examination facts which might bear on credibility is, of course, a le-
gally permissible and strategically sound device, which is designed to prevent the opposition from
creating the false impression that the direct examiner is trying to keep something from the jury.
See, e.g., United States v. Rothman, 463 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 956 (1972),
(and cases cited therein); United States v. Stroble, 431 F.2d 1273, 1275 (6th Cir. 1970).
44. After the meeting with Berk, Judge Gordon quite rightly recused himself as the trial
judge, and the case was thereafter handled by Chief Judge Reynolds. Judge Gordon also wrote to
counsel for the government and the defense outlining what transpired at the meeting. 582 F.2d at
1105.
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Over strenuous defense objection that the cross-examination was
beyond the scope of the direct examination, the district court allowed
the government to elicit from Berk the fact that he had told Judge
Gordon that he, Berk, was president of the Frankenthal business and
that if the trial went ahead on its presently scheduled date, the com-
pany's financial position could be jeopardized with ensuing harm to the
company's 1800 employees. While Berk admitted that he had dis-
cussed the "timing" of the trial, he emphatically denied he had ex-
pressed any concern to Judge Gordon regarding the trial's outcome.45
In rebuttal, the government called Judge Gordon as a witness. In
his brief testimony,46 Judge Gordon summarized the May 26, 1977
meeting during which he insisted Berk had expressed concern over the
results of the case.47 The defendant was convicted. On appeal, a unan-
imous panel affirmed.
At the threshold of the opinion, the Seventh Circuit summarily
rejected as "frivolous" the argument that the cross-examination was be-
yond the scope of the direct examination, for under rule 611 (b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, cross-examination is allowed on all "mat-
ters affecting the credibility of the witness. '48 Since the bias or interest
of a witness is always relevant to discrediting the witness, 49 it is neces-
sarily a proper subject of exploration on cross-examination. Moreover,
since inquiry into the area of bias or interest is never collateral, the
court properly held that the rule prohibiting impeachment on collateral
matters is not violated by extrinsic proof of a witness' bias.50 Finally,
the fact that the witness' behavior was not induced by the defendant or
his counsel was held not to bar the impeachment. 5'
In Frankenthal, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a district
court had the discretion to limit the extent of proof even where bias or
45. Id.
46. The testimony occupied but five pages in the trial transcript. Id. at 1105-06.
47. Judge Gordon testified that Berk said "that, 'if there should be a conviction' the compa-
nies and the employees would suffer financially." Id. at 1106.
48. Id. at 1105 n.1. FED. R. EVID. 611(b) provides:
Scope of cross-examination. Cross examination should be limited to the subject matter
of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct
examination.
49. 582 F.2d at 1106, quoting 3A WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 940; Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 316 (1974); see Philadelphia and Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 448, 461 (1840);
cf. Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 310-11 (1895) (the defendant has a deep personal
interest in the result of the suit, and that should be considered by the jury).
50. 582 F.2d at 1106. Of course, the extent of such impeachment is subject to the court's
discretion. United States v. Lawinski, 195 F.2d 1, 7-8 (7th Cir. 1952); see United States v. Garelli,
333 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1964), ceri. denied, 380 U.S. 917 (1965); FED. R. EVID. 61 l(a).
51. 582 F.2d at 1106-07.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
interest is involved, and that a proper exercise of this discretion would
be where the proof was cumulative. 52 In the Frankenthal case, the
court was unwilling to find the impeachment to have been cumulative.
However, the opposite result was reached in United States v. Fitzger-
ald.53
In Fitzgerald, the defendants were convicted, after an eight week
jury trial, for their part in the scheme which involved the unlawful pay-
ment of more than $2 million to public officials in connection with the
building of a public works project.54 On appeal, the defendants argued
that the district court's restriction of cross-examination of one of the
government's chief witnesses prevented them from fully demonstrating
the witness' bias.55 While the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that "[a]
defendant may not be deprived of the right of 'effective' cross-examina-
tion where he is attempting to show bias on the part of a government
witness,"5 6 the court was equally faithful to the principle that a district
court has "wide discretion to limit cross-examination, particularly
when further cross-examination into the witness's subjective thoughts
would not be meaningful because of previous testimony revealing the
witness's bias."'57 According to the Fitzgerald court, the question is al-
ways "whether the jury had sufficient information to make a discrimi-
nating appraisal of the witness's motives and bias. ' 58 After reviewing
the claimed errors in the context of the entire trial,59 the Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected the claims of limitation on cross-examination and, as in
Frankenthal, sustained the district court's exercise of discretion.
These same themes found further expression in United States v.
52. Id. at 1106. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 230 (1940);
United States v. Kirby, 587 F.2d 876, 883 (7th Cir. 1978) (refusal to allow evidence of certain
testing procedures in defendant's case-in-chief was within the district court's discretion under rule
403 where the defense had ample opportunity to cross-examine government's experts and to show
thereby what was sought to be shown in the defense's case-in-chief).
53. 579 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 610 (1978).
54. 579 F.2d at 1016.
55. Id. at 1021.
56. Id.
57. United States v. Hansen, 583 F.2d 325, 332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978).
58. 579 F.2d at 1021. See Corpus v. Beto, 469 F.2d 953, 955 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Jordan, 466 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1972).
59. According to the court, the witness testified for eleven days and was:
exhaustively cross-examined on: his receipt of immunity; subsistence and expense pay-
ments from the government; his personal and corporate liability for civil tax assessments
and fraud penalties; his tax liability, as well as that of his brothers; the attempts he made
to get immunity for his Swiss associates; and his remaining interests in ITAG and
BESSI.
579 F.2d at 1021. In light of the intensity, pervasiveness, and duration of the cross-examination, it
is not surprising that the appellant could only find four questions which were disallowed.
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Zoperstein.60 There, Pepa, a government witness, gave extremely dam-
aging testimony against one of five co-defendants. On cross-examina-
tion, the witness admitted he had made prior inconsistent statements to
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 61 When the government,
on re-direct examination, sought to elicit the reasons for the inconsis-
tencies, the district court examined the witness out of the presence of
the jury to avoid any prejudice to the defendants. 62
During the course of the voir dire hearing, Pepa explained that he
had lied to the FBI because he was frightened of what Ziperstein would
do to him or his family if he told the truth. After deciding that there
was a sufficient basis on which to allow the examination to proceed, the
district court ruled that Pepa could testify that he was afraid of Ziper-
stein, but not about the reasons for that fear.63 Thereafter, Pepa testi-
fied before the jury that he had falsified information to the FBI because
of fear. However, despite the earlier ruling, the district court refused to
allow Pepa to state that he was afraid of Ziperstein. 64 In response to
Ziperstein's arguments on appeal that the above testimony was errone-
ously received, the Seventh Circuit responded: "The arguments by de-
fendant Ziperstein that he was prejudiced by this interchange border
on the frivolous. ''65
Previous Cross-Examination Decisions
The cases discussed above are consonant with an undeviating line
of decisions in the federal courts which recognize that the range of ex-
ternal circumstances from which probable bias or motivation can be
inferred is as vast as human nature is diverse. These cases further
demonstrate the law's abiding concern that all facts and circumstances
which tend to show that a witness may shade his testimony for the pur-
60. 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1979). The defendants were charged with mail fraud and conspir-
acy to defraud the United States in connection with the running of certain medical clinics.
61. Hereinafter referred to as the FBI.
62. 601 F.2d at 291-92. To insure that there was a basis for this testimony, Judge Will re-
quired Pepa to substantiate his allegations with evidence of specific incidents. Id. at 292. From a
purely theoretical perspective, it is questionable whether a showing of a rational and empiric basis
for a witness' fear is really a prerequisite for admissibility. However, from a pragmatic perspec-
tive, a hearing will help to prevent mendacity and to prevent the government from being able
unfairly to rehabilitate witnesses. The power of a district court to require such a hearing is
scarcely open to doubt. See FED. R. EvID. 104 and 61 l(a). See, e.g., United States v. Bohle, 445
F.2d 54, 75 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1345 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
No. 78-1751 (Oct. I, 1979).
63. 601 F.2d at 292.
64. Id.
65. Id. See United States v. Franzese, 392 F,2d 954 (2d Cir. 1968), vacatedon other grounds,
394 U.S. 310 (1969).
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pose of helping to establish one side of a cause only, be brought to the
attention of the trier of fact.66 When the Seventh Circuit decisions on
cross-examination issued during the 1978-79 term are compared with
earlier decisions, it is immediately apparent that they do not signal any
radical shift in doctrine or approach.
For example, in Carbo v. United States,67 the defendant sought to
impeach the credibility of one of the government's chief witnesses,
Jackie Leonard, "by showing that he had through his wife corruptly
expressed a willingness to suppress his testimony and depart the coun-
try if he were paid $25,000.00."68 The government recalled Leonard to
explain this offer as founded not on corruption but on fear. 69 Leonard
testified, inter alia, that one Stanley, a friend of co-defendant Sicca, had
called upon him "seeking to persuade [him] not to give testimony in the
[forthcoming trial]."'70 On two occasions, Stanley was accompanied by
one Steve Calla. Stanley told Leonard that Calla was a friend of
Sicca's and a convicted murderer. In Leonard's words, "He said Mr.
Calla had been in the penitentiary in Cleveland for murder; and I said,
'Murder?' He said, 'Yes, he beat them to death. He was a strong-arm
man.',7" As in Frankenthal and Ziperstein, there was no evidence that
the conduct was at the behest of, or under the direction of, the defend-
ants.
Notwithstanding the absence of proof of causal connection be-
tween the witness' fears and acts of the defendants, and despite the fact
that the jury might have inferred from Stanley's friendship with Sicca
that the defendant had instructed him to threaten Leonard, 72 the Ninth
Circuit held that Leonard's testimony was proper.73
66. The rule allowing impeachment to show bias or motivation seeks to protect the integrity
of the fact-finding process by insurin& that the fact-finder has at his disposal all relevant data
which will enable him to render an informed judgment. The well-spring from which flows a
witness bias or motivation is of no moment; it is the existence of a given mental state and its
consequent impact on the fact-finding process which is important. See generally, C. MCCORMICK,
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 40 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as MCCORMICK].
67. 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
68. 314 F.2d at 744.
69. It is fundamental that a witness impeached with prior inconsistent statements may always
endeavor to explain away the effect of the supposed inconsistency by whatever circumstances
would naturally remove it, including fear. See United States v. Franzese, 392 F.2d 954, 960 (2d
Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969), quoting 3 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at
§ 1044; United States v. Pritchard, 458 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 911 (1972).
70. 314 F.2d at 744.
71. Id.
72. In Frankenthal, the defense unsuccessfully raised the same kind of objection. See 582
F.2d at 1107.
73. 314 F.2d at 744. See also United States v. Barone, 458 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Franzese, 392 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310
(1969).
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A similar result was reached in United States v. Schennault. 74
There, Rodriguez, a co-defendant with Schennault, entered a plea of
guilty before trial.7 5 He was later called as a defense witness and as-
sumed full responsibility for the crime, testifying that defendant was
not a participant. In rebuttal, FBI agent Jordan "testified that Rodri-
guez had told him that he was afraid of Schennault and had to take the
blame so that Schennault would not 'get me.' "76 Despite the absence
of any causal connection between the witness' fear and conduct of the
defendant, and notwithstanding the potential for "prejudice" to the de-
fendant, the conviction was affirmed. 77
The question which immediately arises is whether the precedential
contribution of these cases has been eroded by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. There is nothing readily apparent in the rules which would
bar the introduction of the impeachment evidence discussed earlier.
Indeed, United States v. Frankentha78 supports this view. In sustaining
conviction, the Seventh Circuit in Frankenthal rejected the argument
that the probative value of the evidence regarding bias was "grossly
outweighed by unfair prejudice". 79 While the Seventh Circuit sug-
gested that this was a proper ground of attack under rule 403,80 the
court underscored the fact that defense counsel was fully aware of the
potential impeachment when he voluntarily called Berk to the stand.8'
74. 429 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1970).
75. Id. at 855.
76. Id.
77. Id. Accord, United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
964 (1972).
78. 582 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1978).
79. Id. at 1107. One aspect of this argument was that "injecting a federal judge into a crimi-
nal trial on the Government's side necessarily involves the prestige and authority of his office in
support of a conviction." Id. The court rejected the argument in this case as swiftly as it had
when a variant of it was earlier presented in United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972). In response to the claim that permitting the United States Attor-
ney to testify for the government involved the prestige of the office on behalf of the government,
the Seventh Circuit said: "As to the awesome-office theory, we do not agree that the mere fact that
a witness holds an office of public trust should disqualify him as a witness if he would otherwise
be able to offer relevant, competent and material evidence as to any issue in a trial." 452 F.2d at
288.
80. For the text of rule 403, see note 13 supra.
81. 582 F.2d at 1107. The court seemed to suggest that defense counsel could have avoided
the whole problem by acquiescing in the district court's suggestion to have Berk's testimony strick-
en. Id. This begs the very question to be decided. Either the impeaching testimony was proper or
it was not. It is idle to suggest that by giving up his constitutional right to call witnesses, the
defendant could have avoided the prejudice. This kind of Hobson's choice cannot withstand scru-
tiny. Cf Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (defendant need not surrender one consti-
tutional right in order to assert another); DeBeers Consolidated Mines Ltd. v. United States, 325
U.S. 212, 222 (1945) (where court is without authority to demand security under the circumstances
presented, it is equally without authority to compel the proffer of a bond by the seizure of prop-
erty).
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The court also rejected the contention that the jury might have inferred
that the defendant, her father, or her counsel must have prompted Berk
to meet Judge Gordon. In sum, the court concluded that there was an
absence of the unfair prejudice82 required before rule 403 is operative. 83
In its basic structure, the Frankenthal opinion echoes the earlier
penetrating insights of Judge Friendly in United States v. Briggs84 con-
cerning objection to evidence offered by a witness, Jeffries, that defend-
ant Briggs had threatened him:
Whether the receipt of such threats be characterized as showing
"bias," or "corruption," or "interest," their relevance as impeaching
Jeffries' testimony is too apparent to require argument . . . . No
doubt this evidence was "prejudicial" to Briggs in the sense that if
the jury believed the agent, the evidence would tend strongly toward
conviction. But it was also highly probative on the credit to be given
the turncoat informer. This is not the kind of "prejudice" against
which the law of evidence can or should protect. 85
The Frankenthal opinion also implicitly recognizes the wisdom and ap-
plicability of Mr. Justice (then Judge) Stevens' observation, articulated
in a different context, that "[t]he importance of minimizing ...
prejudice does not outweigh the necessity for preserving fair and ac-
cepted procedures." 86
1978-79 Seventh Circuit Decisions Involving Extrinsic Evidence
Davis v. Frees87 dealt with a problem which daily plagues courts:
namely, the extent to which a cross-examiner may go in order to prove,
by extrinsic evidence, the mendacity of a witness who falsely testifies on
direct examination to an arguably "collateral" matter. In Davis, the
82. It should not be forgotten that prior to rule 403, courts had the discretionary authority to
exclude evidence the prejudicial effect of which unfairly outweighed the probative significance.
See, e.g., United States v. Ostrowsky, 501 F.2d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hines,
470 F.2d 225, 228 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973).
83. See United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979)
(impeachment with prior inconsistent statements before a grand jury pursuant to rule 801(d)(l)(A)
not violative of rule 403). In a number of other cases during the 1978-79 term, the Seventh Circuit
also rejected requests for reversal based on rule 403.
84. 457 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 986 (1972).
85. 457 F.2d at 910-11; United States v. Cole, 463 F.2d 163, 168 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 942 (1972).
86. United States v. Davis, 437 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1971). See also United States v.
Franzese, 392 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310
(1969) ("[wlhile rehabilitation of this sort [i:e., reference to witnesses' fear of defendants] may well
have a spill-over effect, the process is essential to development of the truth and reliance must be
placed on trial judges to prevent unfair tactics by the prosecution"); United States v. Allen, 159
F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 838 (1947) (Frank, J.) ("the undoubtedly grave
problem of providing adequate safeguards against convictions of the innocent must be solved in
some way other than that of refusing to allow reasonable inferences to be made").
87. 583 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1978).
EVIDENCE
plaintiff brought a civil rights action against a Chicago police officer
who shot Davis during an altercation. On his own direct examination,
"apparently, to bolster his own credibility and to blunt the possible in-
ference that he lacked any good reason to be where he was at the place
and time of the incident," 88 the plaintiff testified that he owned three
businesses and at the time of the shooting he was on his way to one of
them. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked whether the plain-
tiff had filed income tax returns for the years 1973-75. The avowed
purpose of the cross-examination was to impeach the plaintiffs general
credibility. 89
On appeal, the defendant abandoned this theory of general char-
acter impeachment, and sought to justify the questioning on the basis
that the plaintiffs failure to have reported any income from these busi-
nesses would be inconsistent with the claims of ownership. 90 The Sev-
enth Circuit held that the issue was collateral and thus was not subject
to impeachment by independent evidence, although the defendant
could make inquiry on cross-examination. 9'
While the court recognized that the plaintiff had gratuitously in-
jected the topic of ownership during his own direct examination, it still
refused to sanction proof of the possible mendacity by independent evi-
dence. The court's articulation of an apparently per se prohibition
against collateral impeachment of possibly mendacious testimony vol-
unteered on direct examination is unsound, and, especially in civil
cases, will tend to encourage perjury.
The rule against collateral impeachment teaches that cross-exami-
nation on collateral matters is limited to the answer given by the wit-
ness.92 However, notwithstanding the contrary positions of Professors
Wigmore93 and McCormick, 94 most courts, sensitive to the profound
dangers that perjury poses to the integrity of the fact-finding process,
have allowed such impeachment when the collateral matter has been
injected into the fabric of the trial by the witness on his own direct
examination. This has been the rule in the United States Supreme
Court95 and the Seventh Circuit. 96
88. Id. at 342.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. See FED. R. EvID. 608.
92. Collateral matters are generally defined as those which are not independently provable
regardless of the contradiction. See MCCORMICK, supra note 66, § 47 at 98-100.
93. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 1007.
94. MCCORMICK, supra note 66, § 47 at 98.
95. See, e.g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
96. See United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1975) (doctrine of curative admissibil-
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By sanctioning the cross-examination, Davis implicitly recognized
the relevance of the questions. Hence, rather than having enunciated a
per se rule of exclusion, the court would have been better advised to
have committed the matter to the informed discretion of the district
court, as envisioned by rule 403.97
A second and equally important part of the Davis opinion dealt
with the instructions given to the district court for guidance in the re-
trial of the case. The court noted that since all the jury would hear
were the question and answer regarding ownership of the businesses
and the payment of taxes, in exercising discretion to allow the cross
examination on such issues, the trial court must be satisfied that there is
a basis in fact for the ultimate inferences defense counsel would have
the jury draw.98
This satisfaction of the court is the vivifying principle which
emerges from Davis: Before a cross-examiner can be allowed to ask
questions containing negative prejudicial implications, the district court
must satisfy itself that there is some basis for the questions. The point
was perhaps most strongly made several years ago in United States v.
Bohle.99 There, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Bearing in mind that attorneys are of'-cers of the court, we would be,
not only of the hope, but of the opinion, that the occasion of putting
the prejudicial content before a jury with no intent to make use of the
foundation thus laid would be indeed minimal. Nevertheless, the
difficult question remains as to how the duty is to be enforced in the
rare case to the contrary ...
Where a trial judge is aware of the possibility that counsel intends to
ask an impeaching question having prejudicial implications, it is
proper and advisable, in the interests of avoiding abuse and of insur-
ing a fair trial to both the prosecution and the defendant, that thejudge inquire of counsel whether the question on which he is about
to embark is for the purpose of impeachment and whether and how
counsel intends to follow up the question with impeaching proof. If
there is no intention to introduce such impeaching proof, the ques-
tion may, in the court's discretion, be properly excluded. °°
ity); United States v. Jansen, 475 F.2d 312, 316 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973). While
Jansen did not deal with extrinsic proof, since the witness on cross-examination admitted the
falsity of his direct examination, the court's reliance on Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954), which did allow extrinsic impeachment, indicates reacceptance of the Seventh Circuit's
earlier preference for a rule which would allow independent contradiction. The court in Davis
made no mention of Jansen.
97. See note 13 supra for the text of rule 403.
98. 583 F.2d at 342. The cross-examination of the plaintiff was not the basis for acquittal.
99. 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971).
100. Id. at 74. Accord, United States v. Fowler, 465 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also
United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 78-6734 (June 18, 1979); Du-
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In addition, Mr. Justice (then Judge) Stevens, in United States v. Har-
ding,'0' quoted Professor Wigmore 0 2 on the matter:
The same general principle governs the putting of questions to wit-
nesses. The jury may under certain circumstances obtain an impres-
sion, from the mere putting of illegal questions which are either
answered in the negative or are not answered because illegal and ex-
cluded, that there is some basis of truth for the question. When a
counsel puts such a question, believing that it will be excluded for
illegality or will be negatived, and also having no reason to believe
that there is a foundation of truth for it, he violates professional
honor. ' 03
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS AND RULE 801(d)(1)(B)
United States v. Guevara
United States v. Guevara'0 4 is one of those rare cases where the
Seventh Circuit arrived at the right result for the wrong reasons and in
the process may have sanctioned future use of the same kind of evi-
dence which the court itself had sought to proscribe. 05 Mr. Justice
Holmes long ago observed that "[o]ne may criticise even what one re-
veres." '0 6 It is in this spirit that the following examination of Guevara
is undertaken.
In Guevara, the defendant contended that Ronald Segal, an in-
formant for the Drug Enforcement Administration, 10 7 had entrapped
him into committing the offenses charged in the indictment in order to
obtain rewards from the DEA. At trial, on his direct examination, Se-
gal related the details of an initial telephone conversation with the de-
fendant and an ensuing face-to-face meeting with him. Then,
apparently without objection from the defense, Segal testified that he
called agent Nedoff of the DEA, and related the details of the meeting
and phone conversation to Nedoff. 0 8
On cross-examination, the defense sought "to establish a charge of
rant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jordan, 454 F.2d
323, 325 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Phillips, 217 F.2d 435, 443-44 (7th Cir. 1954).
101. 525 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1975).
102. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 1808.
103. 525 F.2d at 91 n.17 (emphasis in original).
104. 598 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1979).
105. Judges Bauer, Sprecher and Tone were in agreement that the district court had erred in
admitting certain rebuttal testimony. Judges Bauer and Sprecher, however, felt that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Tone differed with the majority on the harmless error
question and voted to reverse. See id. at 1101.
106. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 473 (1897).
107. Hereinafter referred to as the DEA.
108. 598 F.2d at 1099. The precise details were, of course, repeated for the jury's benefit.
Thus, in essence, Segal was merely repeating what he had just told the jury.
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improper motive underlying Segal's testimony as to the defendant's
predisposition to engage in the narcotics transaction."'' 0 9 In rebuttal,
over defense objection, the government called agent Nedoff, who testi-
fied that Segal had called him both prior and subsequent to the meet-
ings with the defendant. Nedoff then related the contents of out-of-
court conversations between himself and Segal in which Segal in-
formed him what had transpired at the meetings. In short, Nedoff testi-
fied to Segal's prior consistent statements.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the testimony of Nedoff
was hearsay and that its admission into evidence contravened rule
801(d)(l)(B). 1 0 The panel found that Nedofi's testimony, which re-
lated the contents of the conversations he had with Segal, contained
inadmissible hearsay since the prior consistent statements of Nedoff did
not remove the implication of improper motive from Segal's prior testi-
mony."' This aspect of the decision was unquestionably correct.
However, the majority inexplicably went on to hold that any error in
the admission of Nedofi's testimony was harmless "since it merely estab-
lished that Ronald Segal's previous testimony as to the initial telephone
conversation and meeting with the defendant was consistent with Se-
gal's statement to agent Nedoff in their telephone conversations before
and after the meeting."" i2
It is difficult to quarrel with the ultimate finding of harmless error.
Indeed, the writer is aware of no federal case, civil or criminal, in
which a judgment was reversed because there had been a violation of
the doctrine of prior consistent statements. What is troublesome about
the Guevara opinion is that it radiates a doctrine without avowing it.
109. Id.
I10. Id. at 1100. Rule 801(d) states, in pertinent part:
Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(I) Prior statement by the witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is...
(B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against
him of recent fabrication or improper inference or motive ...
FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(I)(B).
The entire panel was also in agreement, 598 F.2d at 1099-1100, that the admissibility of the
evidence could not be justified under rule 803(24), which excepts from the hearsay rule:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A)
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more proba-
tive on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. ...
FED. R. EvID. 803(24).
111. 598 F.2d at 1100. Rule 802 prohibits the admission of hearsay except as provided in the
Federal Rules of Evidence or by other rules prescribed by the United States Supreme Court.
112. 598 F.2d at 1100. (emphasis added).
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By its phrasing of the conclusion, the court seems unwittingly to have
given its imprimatur to the direct testimony of Segal in which he related
his phone conversations with agent Nedoff.1 3 The Seventh Circuit ap-
parently failed to perceive that this testimony, no less than that of
Nedoff, violated the rule which prohibits the introduction of prior con-
sistent statements in advance of impeachment.
If Guevara was intended to hold that rule 801(d)(1)(B) is not vio-
lated merely because the declarant is the witness, since there is no vio-
lation of the hearsay rule, then Guevara was wrongly decided. There
are several flaws in this thesis. Such a premise fails to recognize that
the prohibition against the introduction of prior consistent statements
on direct examination does not rest only or even chiefly on hearsay
grounds. Indeed, prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, accepted or-
thodoxy regarded the use of prior consistent statements for rehabilita-
tion as not violative of the hearsay rule since they were not offered for
the truth of the matters asserted.1 4 Rather, such evidence was inad-
missible because it is both logically and legally irrelevant." 5
Prior to the adoption of rule 801(d)(1)(B), the federal courts were
uniform in holding that prior consistent statements of a witness were
inadmissible on direct examination to bolster the witness' in-court testi-
mony in advance of a cross-examiner's contention or suggestion that
the witness' direct testimony was one of recent fabrication or that he
had a motive for testifying falsely. Even then, it was still impermissible
to refute such imputation by proof that the witness' previous statements
were consistent with his testimony unless the prior consistency ante-
dated a motive to falsify. 116 Further, this prohibition applied regard-
less whether the witness was the declarant himself or some third
person. "17
113. In these calls, Segal told Nedoff the contents and details of his meetings with the defend-
ant. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
114. 4 WIGIMORE, supra note 8, at §§ 1122-32.
115. Cf Mitchell v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 430 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1970)
(witness' prior statements inadmissible even though qualifying under business records exception
to the hearsay rule). Rule 402 mandates that irrelevant evidence shall not be received.
116. See United States v. Goodson, 502 F.2d 1303, 1307 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Lipton, 467 F.2d 1161, 1168 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973); United States v.
Rodriguez, 452 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bays, 448 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 957 (1972); United States v. DeLaMotte, 434 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir.
1970), ceri. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971); United States v. Lewis, 406 F.2d 486, 492 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 1013 (1969). See also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(B)[01]; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 607[08] (1978) [hereinafter referred to as WEINSTEIN & BERGER];
4 WIGMIORE, supra note 8, at § 1122; Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 909 (1963).
117. See United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1121-22 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940
(1977); United States v. Alexander, 430 F.2d 904, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 8,
at § 1132.
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By sanctioning the use of prior consistent statements as substantive
evidence, rule 801(d)(1)(B) removes the hearsay objection. It does not
pretend to abrogate the pre-rules requirement that the prior consistency
antedate a motive to falsify.' 18 In fact, its very terms preclude any ar-
gument that the rule sanctions the introduction of prior consistent
statements on the direct examination of a declarant. Properly under-
stood, rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not abrogate earlier case law defining
when and under what conditions prior consistent statements are admis-
sible; it merely provides that once such statements are properly re-
ceived, they may be used substantively without violating the hearsay
rule." 19 Where these criteria are satisfied, it is equally proper to allow
the declarant to testify to the prior statement as it is to allow testimony
by a third party. Conversely, where these criteria are not met, as in
Guevara, it is as improper to allow the declarant to testify to the state-
ments as it is to permit their rendition by some third party.
In sum, guidance for future cases would have been better served
had the majority in Guevara not appeared to have implicitly sanctioned
the direct testimony of Segal. That testimony was no less violative of
the prohibition against the premature introduction of prior consistent
statements than was the testimony of Nedoff.
United States v. McPart/in
The doctrine of prior consistent statements and rule 801(d)(1)(B)
were again explored in perhaps the most celebrated criminal case tried
during the 1978-79 term, United States v. McPartiin. 20 McPartlin in-
volved charges of massive bribery of public officials in connection with
an $18 million sludge hauling project undertaken by the defendants on
behalf of the Metropolitan Sanitary District. At the trial, the govern-
ment introduced evidence that one of the defendants, Weber, had made
large cash deposits to an account controlled by him shortly after certain
bribe payments had allegedly been made. 12
In an attempt to rebut this evidence, Weber testified that he ob-
tained the money from a safe-deposit box maintained by himself and
his mother. In addition to his mother's testimony, which corroborated
Weber's version of how the money was obtained, Weber sought to in-
troduce the testimony of his accountant. The accountant was prepared
to testify that in 1973, two years after the deposit, Weber had told him,
118. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 116, at 607-77.
119. Id.
120. 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 78-1751 (Oct. 1, 1979).
121. 595 F.2d at 1351.
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in connection with the preparation of an IRS audit, that the funds were
obtained from Weber's mother. 122 Weber also sought to introduce a
copy of the bank statement which contained the accountant's notation,
"[olverdraft covered and paid in cash from Mother (per FNW)." 123
The district court refused to admit this evidence. 24
On appeal, the evidence was sought to be sustained on the ground
that the accountant's testimony, which would have related Weber's
prior consistent statement, was admissible as a prior consistent state-
ment under rule 801(d)(1)(B). In properly rejecting this argument, the
court recognized that to be admissible the allegedly prior consistent
statement must "have some probative value in rebutting the implied
charge of recent fabrication or improper motive . . [h]owever, where
a motive to falsify also existed at the time of the earlier statement, it
possesses no such probative value"'125 and thus is inadmissible. Since
Weber had as much or more of a motive to falsify at the time of the
IRS audit as at trial, rule 801(d)(1)(B) could not warrant admissibility
of the evidence.126
The court also rejected the argument that the bank statement was
admissible as a business record under rule 803(6)127 on the ground that
the notations contained on the face of the deposit slip were made in
anticipation of IRS litigation and thus lacked the requisite degree of
reliability to warrant admissibility under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule. 128
The McPartlin case could have provided a further interesting facet
of the doctrine of prior consistent statements, had it been brought to the
attention of the Seventh Circuit. At trial, on the direct examination of
its chief witness, the government introduced over strenuous defense ob-
jections what the Seventh Circuit described as "the desk calendar-ap-
pointment diaries" of Benton. 129 The objections raised to the
introduction of the diaries both at trial and on appeal centered solely
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. The defendant properly preserved the point by making an offer of proof in com-
pliance with rule 103(a)(2).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1352.
127. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
128. Id. This holding mirrors prior case law, see, e.g., Williams v. United States, 323 F.2d 90,
95 (10th Cir. 1963); Hartzog v. United States, 217 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1954), and is undoubtedly
correct. The fact the excluded evidence was prepared in connection with a case other than the one
for which the defendant was on trial is obviously of no significance, for the lack of reliability stems
from the purpose prompting preparation not from the identity of the case in which it is to be used.
129. 595 F.2d at 1347.
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around whether they qualified as business records and thus were re-
ceivable as an exception to the hearsay rule under rule 803(6). In sus-
taining the admissibility of the records, the Seventh Circuit explored at
length the reasons why it believed the documents qualified under rule
803(6). 130 However, the question of whether the introduction of the
evidence on Benton's direct examination contravened the doctrine of
prior consistent statements apparently went unnoticed.
The Second Circuit had occasion to consider the interrelationship
of the doctrine and the business records exception to the hearsay rule in
Mitchell v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. 131 There the court
held that the mere fact that a document fell within the business records
exception to the hearsay rule did not justify its admissibility if the doc-
trine of prior consistent statements would be violated thereby. The
Mitchell court stated:
[I]f the person making the business entry is a witness at the trial and
testifies from his own personal knowledge to the events he recorded
there is no ostensible reason for admitting the hearsay written busi-
ness record entry he made. The record's admission could only be
useful to the party calling the witness for the purpose of bolstering
the witness's credibility ....
But, of course, a witness while on the stand may examine his written
record of an occurrence if it assists him to revive his present recollec-
tion of the occurrence and his recollection of the circumstances that
caused him to be an actor therein. Therefore, after Dr. Bashline had
testified from his personal knowledge of his conversation with the
plaintiff and of the professional treatment he prescribed, his "Report
of Illness" was not competent for any purpose .... 132
In view of the fact that the arguments raised in Mitchell were not raised
or considered by the Seventh Circuit in McPartlin, the McPartlin deci-
sion cannot aid in disposition of the question when it is properly
presented to the Seventh Circuit; it is fundamental that "precedent"
cannot be controlling unless there has been a deliberative consideration
in the earlier case of the questions raised in the later one. 133
130. Id. at 1347-51. The court also held that the diaries contained statements which were
made by a conspirator during the course and in furtherance of the charged conspiracy and thus
were admissible under rule 801(d)(2)(E) as non-hearsay. Id. at 1351.
131. 430 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1970).
132. Id. at 1028-29 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 165
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974). But see Tracy v. Goldberg, 289 F.2d 467, 470 (3d
Cir. 1961).
133. See United States v. Webb, 467 F.2d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir. 1972). Accord, City of Kenosha
v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1973); King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 134 n.21 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925); United States v. More, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1090 (3d Cir. 1976);
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CONCLUSION
In the present era, crowded court dockets make it impossible for
judges to be able to plumb the depths of the myriad problems that are
pressed for resolution by anxious litigants. It is astonishing that under
these conditions and in the face of ever-increasing demands on their
energies, the federal courts of appeals consistently are able to render
opinions of extraordinarily high quality.
A comparison of the Seventh Circuit decisions of the past term
with those of a generation ago leads to the conviction that the crafts-
manship on the court today is vastly superior to what it was in the past,
notwithstanding geometric increases in the court's work load. If there
is occasional fault to be found with the court's product, the bar should
look to itself to see if it is performing its responsibilities before being
unduly critical.
Mr. Justice Holmes once observed: "Shall I ask what a court
would be, unaided? The law is made by the Bar, even more than by the
Bench." 134 This history of mutual dependence between bench and bar
imposes on counsel the responsibility of thoroughly and fully present-
ing competing views to the court, "Iflor a judge rarely performs his
functions adequately unless the case before him is adequately
presented."'' 35 Continued allegiance to and fulfillment of these respon-
sibilities, coupled with the high quality of the Seventh Circuit, will in-
sure that this court will continue to be one of the pre-eminent appellate
tribunals in the nation.
United States v. Lowder, 492 F.2d 953, 956 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1092 (1974); Knight v.
St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry, 141 Ill. 110, 114, 30 N.E. 543, 544 (1892).
134. 0. HOLMES, The Law, SPEECHES 16 (1913).
135. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 470 (1916). See Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

